



# Theory of recognition, theory of double inheritance and biology philosophy epistemology:

## A sociopolitical quilombola community in the Amazon Marajoara.<sup>1</sup>

Edson Rogério Nascimento Cruz (Brazil)<sup>2</sup> Federal University of Pará - UFPA

This work develops from the following question: Can sociology understand and explain a certain social phenomenon under review? To handle this challenge we use the theory of recognition and theory of dual inheritance. The empirical part was secured by the data obtained from the quilombola communities of the Marajó archipelago, in the Brazilian Amazon, who are going through a process of struggle for recognition of socio-territorial rights. This is the context in which our research is situated. The efforts so far undertaken have demonstrated how the so-called evolution of the normative mind of human beings is noticeable in the political behavior of social actors of the evidenced communities.

**Keywords:** Culture, Theory of dual inheritance, recognition theory.

### Introduction

Established for much longer, the natural sciences influenced the social sciences at the time when the latter appeared. Later, they started discussions about the specificity of each of these two areas of scientific knowledge. For authors such as Wilhelm Dilthey, the natural sciences explain natural phenomena, while the humanities understand individual and social aspects of life of human beings. This antinomy found a pos-

sibility of reconciliation from authors such as Pierre Bourdieu to defend the compatibility between explanation and understanding within social analysis. In this sense, this paper aims to demonstrate how cultural factors can influence social movements for recognition of rights to facilitate the dialogue between social and natural sciences. Where the cultural value system refers to morality, a common theme in recognition of the theory of Axel Honneth, and the theory of dual heritage, are drawn by Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd. Hence the emphasis is on the epistemological relevance of philosophy of biology to social studies. That is, the cultural aspect, political behaviour component of individuals, is considered under a double determination; social and biological. Methodologically, we sought to develop a literature whose empirical relevance will be expressed - descriptively - through the illustrated quilombo issue here by the collective action of an Amazonian community marajoara object of research/dissertation titled *Recognition, identity and socio-territorial rights: the political aspects of young people in a quilombo community marajoara Amazon* (in progress). Far from exhausting the subject, the work presented here aims to provoke further reflection on an interdisciplinary approach that not only involve different areas of the human sciences, but also the natural sciences, in order to promote stronger social analysis.

## Social Sciences and Natural Sciences: Scientific Sociology Specificity, dual inheritance theory and recognition theory

This section aims to address, through a bibliographic summary, the process of formation of scientific sociology specificity<sup>3</sup>. over time. We start from the understanding that sociology was only established in the modern era, in a context triggered by two great revolutions - the French and the Industrial revolutions. And it came at a time when natural science and some areas of the social sciences were established. Our argument will orbit around three big names of this area of knowledge, namely: Émile Durkheim, Wilhelm Dilthey and Pierre Bourdieu. The choice of these names is justified by rupturous character that each is in relation to its predecessor - in the case of Durkheim, disruption in relation to the prevailing thought that preceded it - which in practice, each of these episodes of break, matched the beginning of a new epistemological perspective within social thought.

It is worth remembering, however, that we cannot ignore the fact that the search for an understanding of human behaviour in society has been a constant since the dawn of humanity. How we understand religious and mythical elaborations form classic examples of these first attempts of understanding the social environment. We remember also those more elaborate efforts of social thought that, even if they do not possess the *status* of science, served as the matrix for this kind of knowledge. From this period we can highlight the works of Kautilya, Aristotle and Ibn Kaldun, for example.

However, it was only on the threshold of modernity that sociological thinking was forged and developed in the following decades. According to Lakatos & Marconi (2008), in the 18th century, figures like Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and furthermore, Charles Fourier, Saint Simon, Robert Owen, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon; finally, Hegel, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus drew up 'valuable works in the field of politics, economics and sociology'. (Lakatos 1990: 41, our

translation)<sup>4</sup>. Besides these names, the authors point out others who were identified as pioneers of sociological thought: Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx. Then immediately appears the list of the main developers of sociology: Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Gabriel Tarde, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Talcott Parson and Robert K. Merton.<sup>5</sup>

Not being our intention to explore each of the contributions of these thinkers, something that would divert us from the purpose initially demarcated, we will from here take Durkheim as a reference in our discussion. This is because Durkheim 'is considered by many scholars [as] the founder of sociology... as an independent science from other social sciences'. (Lakatos & Marconi 2008: 48, our translation).<sup>6</sup> Before Durkheim social thought was influenced by the natural sciences. To illustrate, Bottomore (1973) notes that one of the elements of modern sociology would have been the 'social survey', which was based on two sources. First, 'the growing conviction that the methods of the natural sciences should and could be extended to the study of human affairs, that human phenomena could be classified and measured', and second 'was the concern with poverty' (Bottomore 1973: 18, our translation).<sup>7</sup> Examples of this period are the works of Condorcet, proposing the so-called *social mathematics*; and Quételet with *social physics*. Bottomore (1973: 21) continues:

In the eighteenth century, the social sciences were considered, in general, according to the physical model. In the nineteenth century, sociology was shaped by biology. This is evidenced by the widespread conception of society as an organism, and the attempts to formulate general laws of social evolution. (our translation)<sup>8</sup>

This paradigm that points to the rapprochement between the methods of the natural sciences and the humanities, reflected in Durkheim's argumentation:

In the study of social life, one of the concerns of Durkheim was to assess which method would do it in a scientific way, overcoming the shortcomings of common sense. It concludes that it should resemble adopted by the natural sciences, but by no means be your decal, because the facts that sociology examines belong to the social realm and have peculiarities that

distinguish them from natural phenomena. Such a method should be strictly sociological. Based on it, social scientists would investigate possible relationships of cause and effect and regularities with a view to the discovery of laws and even 'rules of action for the future', noting strictly defined phenomena. (Quintanero 2002: 72-73, our translation)<sup>9</sup>

The above passage makes clear that Durkheim envisioned the realisation of a method of sociology, although it mirrored the methodology of the natural sciences. While we cannot neglect the influence of organicism<sup>10</sup> that Albert Schäffle had on his thinking, both Schäffle and Durkheim however did not see that methodological analogy nothing more than as a 'metaphor':

According to Durkheim, one of the most important contributions of Schäffle for social thought is that this author has defined a morphological analysis model very useful for the main structural components of different types of companies. In doing so, Schäffle widely used organic analogies, comparing the various parts of society to the organs and tissues of the body. This process is, according to Durkheim, perfectly valid because Schäffle had not intended to infer directly the properties of the social organisation of organic life. On the contrary, Schäffle insists that the use of biological concepts is only a 'metaphor' that helps to facilitate the sociological analysis. (Giddens, 2005: 111, our translation)<sup>11</sup>

Durkheim himself in *The Division of Social Work* [1999], after addressing the distinction between social solidarity, leads us to this understanding when he wrote: 'The same law [governing *the mechanical solidarity* and *organic solidarity*] chairs the biological development'. (p. 175, our translation)<sup>12</sup>. Not by chance the corresponding topic in this section is entitled *Analogy between this development of social types and organic types in the animal kingdom*.

As stated above, we take Durkheim as an initial reference in our brief journey of the scientific specificity of sociology because he is considered the first to create its own methodology to this area of knowledge. This does not imply that his ideas have not been challenged. And it is on this issue that we now turn. The author chosen to illustrate such critique will be Wilhelm Dilthey.

Dilthey is a titan that resists complete absorption of human studies in a unified approach by the principles of positivism. He says *no* to this, supports the specificity of scientific and human philosophical studies, emphasising that *human understand (verstehen) and the natural sciences explain (erklären)*. (Franco 2012: 15, our translation)<sup>13</sup>

It is noticed immediately that Dilthey defends the non-incorporation of the Human Sciences Natural Sciences. But that does not mean he campaigns for the removal of the two. Instead, he speaks in defense of the relationship between both, protecting the fact that 'human studies also use *other* methods and reach different results'. (Bottomore 1973: 57, our translation)<sup>14</sup>. For Dilthey *comprehension* means understanding through the *sense*: 'This is because only the human makes sense for the man.' (Machado Neto & Machado Neto 1983: 4, our translation)<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore, in Diltheyian thought:

The methodology of the natural sciences would have a negative effect on the other because makes use hypothetical understandings (or 'hypostatized'), the natural sciences position the objects of the humanities as cause the objects of nature, interpreting them *as given on its mere appearance and duration*. Thus, the natural sciences (positive) would exert an 'abstractive' action on the knowledge of human. Such action would result from hypothetical-positive deals from the natural sciences, and this deal offers the risk of distortion of the human experience on the agenda of sciences that address this issue. (Kahlmeyer-Mertens 2012: 223, our translation)<sup>16</sup>

Given the above, it is not hard to see the difference between Dilthey thought and Durkheimian ideas in relation to the theoretical and methodological markers of Social Sciences and/or the Humanities. We now introduce to our discussion, another exponent of this argument, Pierre Bourdieu.

Bourdieu follows a relatively opposite way to Dilthey. While that was favourable to the distance of Humanities and Natural Sciences, that came support reconciliation between the two. Bourdieu is among the supporters of compatibility between explanation and understanding within social analysis. As the French author asserts: 'Against old diltheyana distinction, it must be said to understand and explain are the same'. (Bourdieu 2008: 700, our translation).<sup>17</sup> This

paper aims to demonstrate that human and natural sciences are not necessarily set apart when it comes to social analysis. If Bourdieu argues that understanding and explanation are the same, we believe they can be combined.

One way to make this proposal viable is to return attention to how the co-evolution gene-culture influences human behaviour. This is where the philosophy of biology<sup>18</sup> emerges, especially if we take as a parameter one of its aspects - the theory of dual heritage employed by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson. Regarding the thought of these authors, Karla Chediak (2008: 54-55) says the following:

Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, who are dedicated to the study of human evolution, believe that what occurs is a human co-evolution gene-culture, where culture is not under the control of the gene, since both interact. Although culture is not unique to the human species, their cumulative character is a specificity of our species. (our translation)<sup>19</sup>

It is noted in the above quote that the thought of Boyd, Henrich and Richerson sheds light on how culture and genetics are interdependent factors in the evolutionary process of human behaviour. Such evolution differs from the evolution of other species of animals, precisely because we carry traces of a genetic inheritance and others. In the words of the authors: 'The use of socially learned information (culture) is central to human adaptations. We investigate the hypothesis that the process of cultural evolution has played an active, leading role in the evolution of genes'. (Boyd, Henrich & Richerson 2010: 1). In this sense, Abrantes and Almeida (2012) show how the theory of dual heritage advocates the idea that culture influenced the formation and evolution of the human mind, deriving from it our moral and legal sense. It is from this point that we intend to follow from now on.

Abrantes and Almeida (2012) operate on the assumption that we are able to act as standards because of the regulation of typical institutions of human society - such as law, religion and morality - and take the theory of dual heritage to highlight the preponderance of culture in the development of human psychology. This proposition was originally forwarded by

Robert Boyd (2012: 4) as follows:

I hypothesise that this new social world, created by rapid cultural adaptation, led to the genetic evolution of new, derived social instincts. Cultural evolution created large cooperative groups. Such environments favoured the evolution of a suite of new social instincts suited to life in such groups including a psychology which 'expects' life to be structured by moral norms, and that is designed to learn and internalise such norms.

One of the points on this topic treated by Abrantes and Almeida (2012) involves the so-called moral community and symbolic markers. They call attention to how the evolution of innate psychology made individuals increasingly able to identify the symbolic markers of the group to which they belonged. As Boyd, Henrich and Richerson (2010) also argue, this is the very psychological capacity of human beings. Moreover, this dynamic identification of markers reveals how symbolic markers form moral communities. A moral community is a social group culturally composed of moral norms whose sense of belonging is indicated by the so-called symbolic markers, ie the symbols that characterise the group. This is how symbolic markings enable the formation of the identity of its members: 'This symbolic network of cultural variants is at the origin of human regulatory systems, such as law, religion and morality.' (Boyd, Henrich & Richerson 2010: 23, our translation).<sup>20</sup>

Such a conception is not far from the reality of quilombo communities in Marajó archipelago, in the Brazilian Amazon, as they are endowed with a particular legal system. Cardoso (2010) and Cardoso, Schmitz and Mota (2011) address these regulatory systems as a local constitution and as local legal practices, respectively. The core of such understanding is the land use planning according to local values:

The local legal practices 'are tangles of fruits of various constitutive legal orders of the social world and interpretations that subjects produce from the confluence of these various orders, aiming to define their social relationships, whether internal to the community, with the state or other groups social with which they have relations.' (Cardoso, Schmitz & Mota 2011: 3, our translation)<sup>21</sup>

The local constitution, in turn, brings to the term 'constitution', an understanding:

The intrinsic notions of rights and place were built to organise territory and social relations. The anthropological literature on quilombo communities, be it the result of expert research or academic research in the strict sense, provides clues to the complexity of their own legal systems of each quilombo group in Brazil.' (Cardoso 2010: 16, our translation)<sup>22</sup>

Guided by this, Cardoso (2010) notes that the Maroons Marajó communities are committed to recover territories lost over time. As indicated by Cardoso (2008), the community was 'the focus of dispersion' that started the other communities of descendants; those subjects who were enslaved in the Marajó region. Although the author's research came from the Bairro Alto community, but, for example, we can also remember what occurred in the Cauldron community, another quilombo marajoara community, which - according to the data obtained - is experiencing a recent process of demographic density caused by the establishment of new residents coming from the outside of the community; something that allowed us to compare how the native inhabitants tend to rule the territory according to their ancestral standards generally grounded in kinship, and how the new residents who have settled disregard these rules. This contrast helps us here in the perception of the traditional layout of quilombo communities in their territories.

In that sense, Cardoso (2010: 16) demonstrates how the confrontation by socio-territorial rights 'seems to be based on the feeling of (in)justice on the grounds of exploitation of their ancestors as slaves, the expropriation of their lands and the invisibility situation still suffering' (our translation)<sup>23</sup>. The author goes on to assert:

The feeling of (in) justice present in the quilombo communities have intimate relationship with what Geertz (1997) called *local legal sensitivity*, i.e. the sense of justice itself every society, in the case of quilombo communities, the feeling of (in)justice, which is characterised by disruption of the local legal system caused by agents external to the group. (ibid., emphasis added, our translation)<sup>24</sup>

This analysis, by approaching the principles of the struggle for recognition of rights, draws attention to the reaction of a collectivity in a situation that disregards their rights which are not guaranteed by the state. Disrespect and/or a sense of injustice in the legal framework proves a case of deprivation of rights: 'The reactions caused by the feeling of injustice should be seen as the trigger *par excellence* of the struggle for recognition.' (Saavedra & Sobottka 2008: 15, our translation).<sup>25</sup>

For Honneth, the legal sphere - or the right - is just one of the recognised spheres and there, beyond it, two others: love or intimate sphere, and solidarity, or sphere of social esteem. Briefly, the theory of recognition by Honneth adopts three forms of recognition that are possible: love, law, and solidarity. These three forms of recognition correspond respectively to three forms of disrespect: rape, deprivation of rights, and degradation. The damage from disrespectful experiences is solved when there is recognition. To remedy the damage caused by violation, recognition comes in the form of self-confidence; to remedy the damage caused by deprivation of rights, recognition comes in the form of self-respect; to remedy the damage caused by degradation, recognition comes in the form of self-esteem.

Stemming from the above discussion, we suggest that identity based on the symbolic markers that constitute a moral community and the human capacity to assimilate the moral/legal rules and act according to them, the fruits of development of normative mind according to the mind Boyd and Richerson allow dialogue between the theory of dual heritage and the theory of recognition. It is the collective identity of the members of a community that from their symbolic markers assumes the prominent political instrument role in the struggle for recognition of rights waged by individuals when they feel wronged, that which is explained by the evolution of the normative mind.

Therefore, we argue that the theory of dual heritage complements the theory of recognition because together, they provide a new approach towards understanding and explaining political behaviour of human beings. This potentially enriches social



research. If on the one hand, Honneth speaks of disrespect and the need for collective semantics able to interpret individual disappointment as something that affects the community; on the other, the theory of dual heritage goes in search of the evolution of human behaviour through the coevolution gene-culture. Therefore, the relevance of the interaction of these two theories emerges from the fact that they seek to further contemplate the complexity of human social life. To take one example, let us recollect the case of the supposed consensus on the theory of social movements today.

Heribert Schmitz (2014) argues that there is a certain consensus on what is meant by social movements. This consensus is expressed in its definition of Predominant Contemporary Theory of Social Movements (TCPMS), a theoretical combination involving the Political Process Theory and the Theory of New Social Movements, where 'the social movements are seen as an interaction a certain length of a network of groups and organisations that want, through protest, carry out or prevent social change.' (Schmitz 2014: 1, our translation)<sup>26</sup>. Schmitz adopts the definition of social movement developed by Rucht (1994):

*A social movement* is an action system that compounds networking groups and organisations with a certain duration supported by a collective identity they want to conduct, prevent or undo a social change through protest - if necessary by the use of force. (Rucht 1994: 76-77 cited in Schmitz 2014: 2, our translation)<sup>27</sup>

For Schmitz (2014), the concept of social movements presented by Rucht limits its application to a historical context and modernity, i.e. to understand that phenomenon is a product of that time. This point is interesting because it allows us to argue about the precedence of the theory of the recognition regarding the theories on social movements when applied to studies on the quilombo communities. Although the quilombos of the past are not to be confused with contemporary quilombo communities, the two representations are historically linked.

The quilombo mobilization revolves around the

earth, that is to say, the quilombo communities seek recognition of rights, especially territorial ones. Thus, besides the historical and the territorial already mentioned, they often trigger other elements such as, for example, identity and ethnicity. These are features that make the theory of recognition a privileged resource to study the political activity of these communities. As theories of social movements form our parameter of inquiry, dated modernity and lacking the ability to retreat to more distant periods, and considering that the quilombo communities are symbolic and historically linked to the quilombos of the slave period are constraints. The possible need for a researcher to go back in time to examine the historical quilombos and the impact of the slavery period in Brazil in our times, for example, is presented as the first obstacle to the use of the theories of social movements in this context.

Other obstacles are observed by Regiane Oliveira Lucas Garcez (2014: 7). Based on the thought of Axel Honneth, the author states that the recognition of the theory advances on two points underexplored by the theory of social movements: 'First, search in the *disrespect experiences* the explanation about how the movements arise. Second, from the notion of *collective semantics* this provides elements to explain *how* such collective actions are possible.' (our translation)<sup>28</sup>. Therefore, the theory allows honnethiana where theories of social movements are not enough. It achieves the factors that motivate individuals to act collectively, factors that go beyond the rationally calculated motivations and, therefore, which are consistent with the cultural and/or evaluative elements of human behaviour.

As Honneth proposes recognition is vital for the subject. Fight for it is not a matter of calculation, but of necessity. Fight is for self-realisation. If, for this, you need to resort to tactics and strategies, nothing should prevent. Nevertheless, connecting experiences and instituting a collective semantics would be the first step. Thus, the recognition of the theory sheds light on the understanding of *how* social movements are made possible without resorting to rationalist explanations. Without the construction of the sense of a community, without understanding something in

common that binds the subject, engagement and action do not exist. (Garcez 2014: 17, our translation)<sup>29</sup>

As we have seen earlier, this is the key idea of the thinking of Honneth, where disrespect motivates action soon after the formation of an identity. Here are some of his words that further illustrates.

Feelings of injury [...] can only become the motivational basis of collective resistance when the subject is able to articulate them in an inter - subjective interpretation framework that shows them as typical of an entire group; in this sense, the emergence of social movements social depends on the existence of a collective semantics that allows an interpretation of personal disappointment of experience as something that not only affects the individual self but also a circle of many other subjects. (Honneth 2003: 258, our translation)<sup>30</sup>

It is important to note that this recognition of the theory highlighted here does not mean the rejection of the theory of social movements for the study of quilombo communities. The theory possesses a certain primacy to allow access to certain subjective aspects of human action that go beyond calculation and rationality, such as the *experiences of disrespect* and the formation of *collective semantics*. We can verify this fact in studies of diachronic order, for example. In this sense, we can say that the theory of dual heritage moves through a field where the theory of the recognition actually has not. However, in our view, it does not mean it is indifferent to it. Thus, we can infer that the cultural approach to the quilombo issue in marajoara Amazon familiarises the theory of Boyd and Richerson with Honneth's theory, distanced from rational choice theory, for example. Finally, consider the following excerpt: 'rational choice theorists introduce the notion of "rational belief" without taking into full account the cultural context in which people find it affects what they consider to be or not a conviction founded on reason.' (Baert 1997: 9, our translation).<sup>31</sup>

## Final considerations

This work has focused on the debate involving understanding and explaining in the field of social analysis. After a brief historical overview about this area of knowledge, we demonstrate that this claim is feasible. Therefore, we use the approximation of the theory of recognition of Axel Honneth and the theory of dual heritage of Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson with subsequent application of them in a concrete case, the political action of the quilombo communities marajoara Amazon. Although preliminary, this essay has considered the challenge of developing such a discussion. As Almeida (2013: 245) asserts:

Social theory has rejected in the past decades, the theoretical approaches that intend to explain human behaviour from biology. There were several reasons for this to happen. Foremost among these is the fact that many of the biological theories do not give culture a significant role in explaining human behaviour. (our translation)<sup>32</sup>

For the purpose of more full-bodied social analysis, we believe it is necessary to continue to promote the interaction between the approaches of social theory and other disciplinary knowledge, like those of the natural sciences. It was no accident that Marcel Mauss (2003: 237) in *Sociology and Anthropology* said: 'Whether we study special facts or general facts, the background is always the complete man deal' (our translation).<sup>33</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Text originally published in the annals of the XXX Congress of the Latin American Sociology Association, 2015, with the title "TEORIA DO RECONHECIMENTO, TEORIA DA DUPLA HERANÇA E A EPISTEMOLOGIA DA FILOSOFIA DA BIOLOGIA NO CONTEXTO DA MOBILIZAÇÃO SOCIOPOLÍTICA DE UMA COMUNIDADE QUILOMBOLA NA AMAZÔNIA MARAJOARA". Available in: <<http://sociologia-alas.org/congreso-xxx/ponencias/>>.

<sup>2</sup>Social Scientist Graduated at Federal University of

Pará (UFPA); Master in Sociology by the Postgraduate Program in Sociology and Anthropology (PPGSA / UFPA); Member of the Afro-Amazonian Studies Group (GEAM / IFCH-UFPA).

<sup>3</sup>In this work, although we seek to address the scientific specificity of sociology, it will not always be this term that is used to refer to this area of knowledge. We will also use 'Humanities' or 'Social Sciences' to contemplate on this. We will concentrate on the polarisation of the Natural Sciences and Humanities. Thus, we believe that will not compromise on the understanding of our argument.

<sup>4</sup>In the original: "[...] obras de grande valor no campo da política, economia e sociologia."

<sup>5</sup>While we must recognise that many others have contributed to the formation and development of sociology and social thought as a whole, the names mentioned above are the ones that commonly appear in the literature.

<sup>6</sup>In the original: "[...] é considerado por muitos estudiosos o fundador da sociologia como ciência independente das demais Ciências Sociais."

<sup>7</sup>In the original: "[...] a crescente convicção de que os métodos das Ciências Naturais deviam e podiam ser estendidos ao estudo das questões humanas, que os fenômenos humanos podiam ser classificados e medidos", o segundo "[...] foi a preocupação com a pobreza [...]."

<sup>8</sup>In the original: "No século XVIII, as Ciências Sociais eram consideradas, em geral, segundo o modelo da física. No século XIX, a sociologia modelou-se pela Biologia. Isso se evidencia pela concepção amplamente difundida da sociedade como organismo, e pelas tentativas de formular leis gerais de evolução social."

<sup>9</sup>In the original: "No estudo da vida social, uma das preocupações de Durkheim era avaliar qual método permitiria fazê-lo de maneira científica, superando as deficiências do senso comum. Conclui que ele deveria assemelhar-se ao adotado pelas ciências naturais, mas nem por isso ser o seu decalque, porque os fatos que a Sociologia examina pertencem ao reino social e têm peculiaridades que os distinguem dos fenômenos da natureza. Tal método deveria ser estritamente sociológico. Com base nele, os cientistas sociais investigariam possíveis relações de causa e efeito e regularidades

com vistas à descoberta de leis e mesmo de 'regras de ação para o futuro', observando fenômenos rigorosamente definidos."

<sup>10</sup>In general, Organicism refers to the theory that analysed society as if she were a living organism. It is commonly associated with positivist thought.

<sup>11</sup>In the original: "Segundo Durkheim, uma das contribuições mais importantes de Schäffle para o pensamento social consiste no facto de esse autor ter definido um modelo de análise morfológica muito útil dos principais componentes estruturais de diferentes formas de sociedades. Ao fazê-lo, Schäffle utiliza largamente as analogias orgânicas, comparando as várias partes da sociedade aos órgãos e tecidos do corpo. Esse processo é, segundo Durkheim, perfeitamente válido, pois Schäffle não pretende deduzir directamente as propriedades da organização social das da vida orgânica. Pelo contrário, Schäffle insiste em que o recurso a conceitos biológicos não passa de uma 'metáfora' que contribui para facilitar a análise sociológica."

<sup>12</sup>In the original: "A mesma lei [que rege a *solidariedade mecânica* e a *solidariedade orgânica*] preside o desenvolvimento biológico."

<sup>13</sup>In the original: "Dilthey é um titã que resiste à completa absorção dos estudos humanos em uma abordagem unificada pelos princípios do positivismo. Ele diz *não* a isto, sustenta a especificidade dos estudos científicos e filosóficos do humano, destacando que as *humanas compreendem (verstehen)* e as *ciências naturais explicam (erklären)*."

<sup>14</sup>In the original: "[...] os estudos humanos usam também *outros* métodos e chegam a resultados diferentes."

<sup>15</sup>In the original: "Isto porque somente o humano faz sentido para o homem."

<sup>16</sup>In the original: "[...] a metodologia das ciências naturais exerceria um efeito negativo sobre as outras, isso porque, por valer-se de compreensões hipotéticas (ou ainda, 'hipostasiadas'), as ciências naturais posicionariam os objetos das ciências humanas tal como fazem com os objetos da natureza, interpretando-os *como dados em sua mera aparência e duração*. Desse modo, as ciências naturais (positivas) exerceriam uma ação 'abstrativa' sobre o conhecimento acerca do humano. Tal ação seria decorrente da lida hipotético-positiva



das ciências naturais, e tal lida oferece o risco de des-caracterização da experiência humana na pauta das ciências que dela se ocupa.”

<sup>17</sup>In the original: “Contra a velha distinção diltheyana, é preciso ser dito que compreender e explicar são a mesma coisa.”

<sup>18</sup>“The philosophy of biology, seen as a subfield of philosophy of science, only constituted and became (relatively) autonomous in the last decades of the twentieth century, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries. We can point out the year 1970 as the milestone. In that decade, some philosophers of science began to dedicate itself specifically to reflect on biology”. (Abrantes 2011: 11)

<sup>19</sup>In the original: “Os antropólogos Robert Boyd e Peter Richerson, que se dedicam ao estudo da evolução humana, acreditam que o que ocorre é uma co-evolução humana gene-cultura, em que a cultura não está sob o controle do gene, pois ambos interagem. Embora a cultura não seja exclusividade da espécie humana, o seu caráter cumulativo é uma especificidade da nossa espécie.”

<sup>20</sup>In the original: “Essa rede simbólica de variantes culturais está na origem dos sistemas normativos humanos, como o direito, a religião e a moral.”

<sup>21</sup>In the original: “As práticas jurídicas locais ‘são frutos de entrelaçamentos de várias ordens jurídicas constitutivas do mundo social e de interpretações que os sujeitos produzem a partir da confluência destas várias ordens, objetivando definir suas relações sociais, sejam internas à comunidade, com o Estado ou com outros grupos sociais com os quais mantêm relações”.

<sup>22</sup>In the original: “[...] as noções intrínsecas de direito local e seu ordenamento, os quais foram construídos para organizar o território e as relações sociais. A literatura antropológica sobre comunidades quilombolas, seja fruto de pesquisas periciais ou acadêmicas *strictu sensu*, fornece pistas sobre a complexidade dos ordenamentos jurídicos próprios a cada grupo quilombola pelo Brasil [...]”.

<sup>23</sup>In the original: “[...] parece estar baseado no sentimento de (in) justiça em razão da exploração de seus antepassados como escravos, da expropriação de seus territórios e da situação de invisibilidade que ainda sofrem.”

<sup>24</sup>In the original: “O sentimento de (in) justiça presente nas comunidades quilombolas tem íntima relação com o que Geertz (1997) denominou de *sensibilidade jurídica local*”, ou seja, o sentimento de justiça próprio a cada sociedade, no caso das comunidades quilombolas, o sentimento de (in) justiça, que se caracteriza pelo rompimento do ordenamento jurídico local de que são vítimas por agentes externos ao grupo.”

<sup>25</sup>In the original: “As reações provocadas pelo sentimento de injustiça devem ser vistas como o estopim *par excellence* da luta por reconhecimento.”

<sup>26</sup>In the original: “[...] os movimentos sociais são vistos como uma interação de certa duração de uma rede de grupos e organizações que pretendem, por meio de protesto, realizar ou impedir mudanças sociais.”

<sup>27</sup>In the original: “Um *movimento social* é um sistema de ação de redes compostos de grupos e organizações com uma certa duração amparado por uma identidade coletiva que pretendem realizar, evitar ou desfazer uma mudança social por meio de protesto – se necessário até pelo uso da força.”

<sup>28</sup>In the original: “Primeiro, busca nas *experiências de desrespeito* a explicação sobre *porque* os movimentos surgem. Segundo, a partir da noção de *semântica coletiva* fornece elementos para explicar *como* tais ações coletivas se tornam possíveis.”

<sup>29</sup>In the original: “Conforme propõe Honneth, o reconhecimento é elemento vital para os sujeitos. Lutar por ele não é uma questão de cálculo, mas de necessidade. Luta-se por autorrealização. Se, para isso, for preciso lançar mão de táticas e estratégias, nada os impede. Mas conectar experiências e instituir uma semântica coletiva seria o primeiro passo. Assim, a Teoria do Reconhecimento lança luz à compreensão sobre *como* os movimentos sociais se fazem possíveis sem recorrer a explicações racionalistas. Sem a construção do sentido de uma coletividade, sem a compreensão do algo em comum que liga os sujeitos, o engajamento e a ação inexistem.”

<sup>30</sup>In the original: “Sentimentos de lesão [...] só podem tornar-se a base motivacional de resistência coletiva quando o sujeito é capaz de articulá-los num quadro de interpretação intersubjetiva que os comprova como típicos de um grupo inteiro, nesse sentido, o surgi-

mento de movimentos sociais depende da existência de uma semântica coletiva que permite interpretar as experiências de desapontamento pessoal como algo que afeta não só o eu individual mas também um círculo de muitos outros sujeitos.”

<sup>31</sup>In the original: “[...] os teóricos da escolha racional introduzem a noção de ‘convicção racional’ sem levar em conta inteiramente que o contexto cultural no qual as pessoas se encontram afeta o que elas consideram ser ou não uma convicção fundada na razão.”

<sup>32</sup>In the original: “A teoria social tem rejeitado, nas últimas décadas, as abordagens teóricas que pretendam explicar o comportamento humano a partir da biologia. Foram várias as razões para que isso ocorresse. Entre elas, destaca-se a circunstância de que muitas das teorias biológicas não atribuem à cultura um papel relevante para explicar o comportamento humano.”

<sup>33</sup>In the original: “Quer estudemos fatos especiais ou fatos gerais, no fundo é sempre com o homem completo que lidamos.”

## References

- Abrantes, Paulo Cesar. *Filosofia da biologia*. (2011). Porto Alegre: Artmed.
- Abrantes, Paulo César Coelho; ALMEIDA, Fábio Portela Lopes de. (2012). *A TEORIA DA DUPLA HERANÇA E A EVOLUÇÃO DA MORALIDADE*. Available at: <<https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p1>>.
- Almeida, Fábio Portela Lopes de. (2013). *AS ORIGENS EVOLUTIVAS DA COOPERAÇÃO HUMANA E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES PARA A TEORIA DO DIREITO*. Available at: <[http://direitosp.fgv.br/sites/direitosp.fgv.br/files/artigo-Edicao-revista/09-rev17\\_243-268\\_-\\_fabio\\_portela\\_lopes\\_de\\_almeida.pdf](http://direitosp.fgv.br/sites/direitosp.fgv.br/files/artigo-Edicao-revista/09-rev17_243-268_-_fabio_portela_lopes_de_almeida.pdf)>.
- Baert, P. (1997). *ALGUMAS LIMITAÇÕES DAS EXPLICAÇÕES DA ESCOLHA RACIONAL NA CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA E NA SOCIOLOGIA*. Available at: <[http://www.anpocs.org/portal/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=202:rbc-35&catid=69:rbc&Itemid=399](http://www.anpocs.org/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=202:rbc-35&catid=69:rbc&Itemid=399)>.
- Bottomore, T. B. (1973). *Introdução à sociologia*. Brasília: Zahar.
- Boyd, R. (2012). *Cultural adaptation, norms, and the evolution of human cooperation*. Available at: <http://uchv.princeton.edu/workshops/DHVP/Boyd.pdf>.
- Boyd, R., Henrich, J., & Richerson, P. (2010). *Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics*. Available at: [http://www.pnas.org/content/107/Supplement\\_2/8985.full.pdf](http://www.pnas.org/content/107/Supplement_2/8985.full.pdf).
- Bourdieu, P. (2008). *A miséria do mundo*. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
- Cardoso, L. F. C. e. (2008). *A constituição local: direito e território na comunidade de Bairro Alto, na Ilha de Marajó – Pará*. (Tese de doutoramento não publicada), Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Santa Catarina.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (2010). *A CONSTITUIÇÃO LOCAL: Direito e território quilombola na Comunidade de Bairro Alto, Ilha de Marajó – PA*. Available at: <<http://acervo.nova-cartografiasocial.com.br:8088/xmlui/bitstream/handle/738738/1389/artigo%20-%20a%20constitui%E7%E3o%20-%20ufpa.pdf?sequence=1>>.
- Cardoso, L. F. C. e; Schmitz, H. S.; Mota, & D. M. da. (2011). *Direitos entrelaçados: Práticas jurídicas e território quilombola na Ilha do Marajó – PA*. Available at: <<http://ojs.c3sl.ufpr.br/ojs/index.php/campos/article/viewFile/22373/14696>>.
- Chediak, K. de A. (2008). *Filosofia da biologia*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed..
- Durkheim, É. (1999). *Da divisão do trabalho social*. São Paulo: Martins Fontes.
- Franco, S. de G. (2012). “Dilthey: compreensão e explicação” e possíveis implicações para o método clínico. Available at: <[http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1415-47142012000100002&script=sci\\_arttext](http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1415-47142012000100002&script=sci_arttext)>.
- Garcêz, R. L. de O. (2014). *Teoria do Reconhecimento: uma teoria dos movimentos sociais?*. Available at: <[http://www.sndd2014.eventos.dype.com.br/arquivo/download?ID\\_ARQUIVO=4148](http://www.sndd2014.eventos.dype.com.br/arquivo/download?ID_ARQUIVO=4148)>.
- Geertz, C. (1997). *O saber local: novos ensaios em antropologia interpretativa*. Petrópolis: Vozes
- Giddens, A. (2005). *Capitalismo e moderna teoria social*. Lisboa: Presença.
- Honneth, A. (2003). *Luta por reconhecimento: a gramática moral dos conflitos sociais*. São Paulo.
- Kahlmeyer-Mertens, R. S. (2012). *DILTHEY, Wilhelm. Introdução às ciências humanas – tentativa de uma fundamentação para o estudo da sociedade e da história*. Trad. De Marco Antônio Casanova. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 2010. Resenhas Revista Veritas. v. 57, n. 3. Available at:

- <<http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/veritas/article/view/11549>>.
- Lakatos, E. M. (1990). *Sociologia geral*. 6. ed. rev. e ampl. - Sao Paulo : Atlas.
- Machado Neto, A. L.; Machado Neto, Z. (1983). *Sociologia básica*. São Paulo: Saraiva.
- Mauss, M. (2003). *Sociologia e antropologia*. São Paulo: Cosac Naify.
- Quintanero, T. (2002). *Um toque de clássicos: Marx, Durkheim e Weber*. Belo Horizonte: UFMG.
- Saavedra, G. A.; Sobottka, E. A.. (2008 ). *Introdução à teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth*. Civitas Porto Alegre, v. 8, n. 1, p. 9-18, jan.-abr. Available at:  
<<http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/pdf/742/74211531002.pdf>>.
- Schmitz, H.. *Teorias de movimentos sociais em perspectiva comparada*. Debate o discusión en teoría social. GT 20: Sociedad civil: protestas y movimientos sociales, [2014?]. Available at:  
<[http://actacientifica.servicioit.cl/biblioteca/gt/GT20/GT20\\_SchmitzH.pdf](http://actacientifica.servicioit.cl/biblioteca/gt/GT20/GT20_SchmitzH.pdf)>.

---

Edson Rogério Nascimento Cruz (Brazil) Social Scientist Graduated at Federal University of Pará (UFPA); Master in Sociology by the Postgraduate Program in Sociology and Anthropology (PPGSA / UFPA); Member of the Afro-Amazonian Studies Group (GEAM / IFCH-UFPA).

---